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From Interval (Set) and Probabilistic Granules
to Set-and-Probabilistic Granules of Higher
Order
Vladik Kreinovich

Abstract In this chapter, we provide a natural motivation for granules of higher
order, and we show that these granules provide a unified description of different
uncertainty formalisms such as random sets, Dempster-Shafer approach, fuzzy sets,
imprecise probabilities, and Bayesian statistics. We also prove that for fuzzy uncertainty, granules of second order are sufficient.
Keywords: Granules of Higher Order, Random Sets, Dempster-Shafer Approach,
Fuzzy Sets, Imprecise Probabilities, Bayesian Statistics.

1 Introduction
Techniques for representing uncertainty: current situation. Many techniques
have been proposed (and successfully used) to describe and process uncertainty:
•
•
•
•
•
•

sets, in particular, intervals (Rabinovich 2005);
probability distributions (Jaynes 2003), (Rabinovich 2005);
imprecise probabilities (Walley 1989), (Ferson 2002), (Ferson et al. 2003);
Dempster-Shafer approach;
fuzzy sets;
interval-valued (and, more generally, type-2) fuzzy sets (Mendel 2001), (Mendel
Wu 2010);
• Bayesian statistical techniques (Jaynes 2003), (Gelman et al. 2004);
• and many other different approaches.
Natural questions. From this variety, come natural questions:
• Which of the techniques should we apply in different practical situations?
• Are there yet-to-be-discovered better techniques for processing uncertainty?
Vladik Kreinovich
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• How can we combine uncertainty described by different formalisms?
How to answer these questions: a need for classification. To answer all these
questions, it is necessary to come up with a reasonable classification of different
uncertainty techniques. Such classification would enable us:
• to meaningfully compare different techniques, for the purpose of deciding which
is better in different situations,
• to check whether all possible techniques in this classification have been invented,
or new (possible better) techniques are still possible, and
• to meaningfully combine these techniques – since they appear as particular cases
of a general approach to uncertainty.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we start with the question of where our data
comes from, what are the corresponding uncertainties. Based on the corresponding
from-scratch analysis, we explain how different uncertainty techniques appear, and
thus, come up with a natural classification.
In the process of this classification, we provide a natural motivation for granules
of higher order. We also show that these granules provide a unified description of
different uncertainty formalisms.

2 From an Ideal Exact Description to Interval (Set) and
Probabilistic Granules
Idealized objects. To describe the physical world, we identify objects: elementary
particles, atoms, molecules, solid bodied, stars, etc.
An ideal object should be well-defined. For example, in a geographic description,
when we define forests, lakes, rivers, etc., we should be able to determine the exact
boundary between a lake and a river that flows into this lake, the exact boundary
between a forest and a nearby grassy area, etc.
An ideal object should also be reasonably stable with time. From this viewpoint,
• a river is a reasonable geographic object, because its path does not change much
for a long time, while
• a puddle – which is often easily visible too – is not a reasonable geographic
object, because it can disappear in the course of hours.
Group objects. The above description applied to individual objects: we can talk
about the height of an individual man, the speed with which the individual river
flows, etc.
In physics, we are also interested in “group” objects: the mass of an electron,
the magnetic moment of an ion of a specific type. Similarly, in manufacturing, we
are interested in the speed and/or fuel efficiency of a certain type of a car, in the
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frequency of a certain type of a laser, etc. In all these cases, instead of dealing with
an individual object, we have a collection of similar objects.
In the ideal case, we assume that all these objects are identical, so whatever we
can observe based on one of these objects can be applied to others as well. For
example, if we apply safety tests to several cars of the same make and model, and
these tests are successful, we conclude that all the cars of this make and model are
safe.
Idealized description of idealized objects. Ideally, we should have a full description of each (idealized) object. In other words, for each possible quantity (such as
location, mass, height, etc.), we should know the exact value of this quantity for the
given object.
For many physical quantities, there are several different ways to measure the
value of this quantity; ideally, all these ways should lead to the same numerical
result. For example, a GPS location of the car can be measured based on different
parts of this car; all these measurements should lead to the same result. Similarly, a
width of a wooden plank should be the same no matter where we measure it.
In mathematical terms, an (idealized) exact description of an (idealized) object
means that we know, for this object, the exact values s1 , . . . , sn of all possible quantities of interest.
All such tuples s = (s1 , . . . , sn ) of real numbers form an n-dimensional space Rn .
Usually, not all tuples are physically possible. For example, mass is always nonnegative, velocity is always limited by the speed of light, etc. The actual state must
therefore belong to the set S ⊆ Rn of all physically possible tuples.
Comment. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that this set S is known. To get
a more realistic description, we must take into account that this set is not exactly
known – e.g., the speed of light is only approximately known.
Objects are not ideal: aleatoric uncertainty. As we have mentioned, ideally, objects should be well-defined and stable (not changing with time).
In practice, objects are often not well defined. For example, when a river flows
into the lake, it is often not clear where is the boundary between the river and the
lake.
Objects are also not perfectly stable: they change, slightly but change. For example, the weight of a person slightly changes – when she breathes in and breathes out,
when she sweats, etc.
As a result, for the same object, even an ideally accurate measuring instrument
can measure different values:
• the measurement results differ with time because the object changes,
• these results differ because we may select different boundaries for the object, etc.
This “objective” difference is known as aleatoric uncertainty.
Objects are not perfectly identical: another case of aleatoric uncertainty. In
the ideal case, we assumed that all the “instance” of a group object are identical.
In reality, different objects are slightly different. For example, different cars of the
same make and model may have slightly different fuel economy characteristics.
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Different measuring procedures can lead to different values: yet another case
of objective (aleatoric) uncertainty. In the ideal case, all possible procedures for
measuring a given quantity should lead to the exact same result. In practice, different
procedure may lead to slightly different results.
For example, for a non-ideal wooden plank, its width may differ slightly from
one location to another.
Measurements are not 100% accurate: epistemic uncertainty. In the ideal case,
we assumed that all the measurements lead to the exact values of the measured
quantity. In practice, measurements are never 100% accurate; the result xe of each
measurement is, in general, slightly different form the actual (unknown) value x of
def
the desired quantity: ∆ x = xe− x ̸= 0; see, e.g., (Rabinovich 2005).
Thus, even in the ideal case, when the object is well-defined and stable – i.e.,
where there is no aleatoric (“objective”) uncertainty, measurement results can be
different. This uncertainty is “subjective” in the sense that it characterizes not the
object itself, but rather our knowledge about this object. Such uncertainty is called
epistemic.
How to describe aleatoric uncertainty: set (interval) granules. In the ideal case,
each object is characterized by a single state s ∈ S.
Due to aleatoric uncertainty, for the same object, we may get different states s ∈ S,
depending on:
•
•
•
•

at what time we measure the corresponding quantities;
how we define the boundaries of the object;
which object from the group of (almost) identical objects we take; and
which of the possible measuring procedures we use to measure the corresponding
quantities.

Thus, to fully characterize the situation, we must know which states s are possible
for this object and which are not. In other words, in view of the aleatoric uncertainty,
to describe an object, we need to know the set s ⊆ S of all possible states characterizing this object. Different states s ∈ s are “equally” possible, so this set forms a
single set granule characterizing the object.
This set s is usually connected – in the sense that there is a continuous transition
between every two possible states s, s′ ∈ s, In the 1-D case, this connectivity implies
that with every two possible states s and s′ , all intermediate states are also possible
– i.e., that the set s of all possible states is an interval.
How to describe aleatoric uncertainty: probabilistic granules. In addition to
knowing which states are possible and which are not, it is also desirable to know
how frequent are different possible states.
For example, within a population of cars of the same make and model, it is desirable not only to know that the fuel efficiency of an individual car may be lower
than on average, it is also desirable to know how frequent are such low-efficiency
situation:
• if they are rare, it is acceptable, but
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• if such situations are frequent, this is a strong argument against buying this particular model.
Thus, it is desirable to know, for each possible value s ∈ s, a frequency (= probability) that this value occurs when measuring this object. If we know this information, then, instead of a set granule, we have a probabilistic granule.
Description of epistemic uncertainty: set (interval) and probabilistic granules.
Similarly, we can describe epistemic uncertainty.
Indeed, once we know the results se = (e
s1 , . . . , sen ) of measuring the desired quantities, we would like to know which states s are compatible with these measurement
results. In other words, we need to know the set s of all such states – i.e., a set
(interval) granule.
In addition to knowing which states s ∈ S are possible and which are not possible,
it is also desirable to know which values s ∈ s are more frequent and which are less
frequent – i.e., it is desirable to know the frequency (probability) of different value
s. Thus, we also arrive at the need to consider a probability distribution on the set s
of possible states – i.e., a probabilistic granule.
Yet another reason for granulation: need to speed up decision making. Even
when we know the actual element s from S with a good accuracy, it is still often
reasonable, when making a decision, to ignore this difficult-to-process accurate information and to base our decision on the type of an object – i.e., on the granule to
which this object belongs.
For example, when an animal attacks a person, it makes sense to ignore the animal’s eye color and other details of the animal and concentrate of the type of the
animal: e.g., is it a small (mostly harmless) dog or a dangerous tiger.

3 Need for Granules of Granules – i.e., for Granules of Higher
Order
Need for granules of higher order. Ideally, to characterize the uncertainty, we describe
• either the set of possible values
• or the probability distribution on the set of possible values.
This description assumes that we know exactly which values are possible and which
values are not possible – and we know the exact values of the corresponding probabilities.
In practice, we are not always sure which values are possible and which are not,
and do not know the exact values of the corresponding probabilities. In other words,
our knowledge of the corresponding uncertainty is also uncertain.
Thus, instead of a single set-valued granule, we have a granule of possible setvalued granules – a construction which can be naturally described as a granule of
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higher order. Similarly, instead of a single probabilistic granule, we have a granule of possible probabilistic granules – a construction which can also be naturally
described as a granule of higher order.
Motivation for restricting ourselves to granules of second order. For example,
instead of a single set of possible states, we can have a class of possible sets – a
second order construction. This class may also not be exactly known – so we should
consider class of possible classes, a third order construction.
However, from the computational viewpoint, a set is already difficult to process,
a class of sets is even more complex, and a class of classes is practically impossible
to analyze.
Comment. For fuzzy uncertainty, a deeper argument in favor of second-order granules is given in the Appendix; this argument was first outlined in (Nguyen Kreinovich
1998) and (Kreinovich Nguyen 2001).

4 Second-Order Granules: Natural Classification
Classification: general idea. An ideal description of uncertainty is to describe as a
granule – i.e.,
• either a set of possible values
• or a probability distribution on the set of possible values.
In reality, we do not have the exact knowledge of the corresponding granule (i.e., of
the set or of the probability distribution).
When we did not know the exact state, we considered either the set of all possible
states or a probability distribution on the set of possible states. Similarly, when we
do not know the exact granule, we have to consider:
• either a set of possible granules,
• or a probability distribution on the set of possible granules.
In each of these two cases, we have two subcases, depending on whether we consider
set-valued (interval) or probabilistic granules. Thus, we arrive at the four possible
situations:
1.
2.
3.
4.

a set of possible sets;
a set of possible probability distributions;
a probability distribution on the class of possible sets; and
a probability distribution on the class of possible probability distributions.

What we plan to show. At first glance, we have a very mathematical classification.
However, as we will show, these four types of second order granules correspond to
well-known and well-used types of uncertainty – such as random sets, DempsterShafer approach, fuzzy sets, imprecise probabilities, and Bayesian statistics.
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Thus, the idea of second order granules provides a natural unified description of
different formalisms for describing uncertainty.
First case: set of possible sets. In the first case, instead of selecting a single set
of possible values, we select a class of possible sets. This idea is actively used in
representation of uncertainty. For example, in the rough set approach, each set S is
represented by a set S that is contained in S and a set S that contains S. In this case,
the only information that we have about the actual (unknown) set S is that S ⊆ S ⊆ S,
def
i.e., that S belongs to the set interval [S, S] = {S : S ⊆ S ⊆ S}. General set intervals
– not necessarily generated by rough sets – are also actively used; see, e.g., (Yao Li
1996), (Yao et al. 2008).
Second case: a set of probability distributions. In this case, instead of selecting a
single probability distribution, we select a set of possible probability distributions.
This description of uncertainty is known as imprecise probability; see, e.g., (Walley
1991).
An important particular case of imprecise probability is the case of p-boxes
(probability boxes), i.e., interval bounds on the values of the cumulative distribudef
tion function F(x) = Prob(ξ ≤ x); see, e.g., (Ferson 2002), (Ferson et al. 2003).
Third case: a probability distribution on the class of possible sets. In this case,
instead of selecting a single set, we select a probability distribution on the class of
all possible sets. In other words, we assign, to each set, a probability that this is
indeed the right set.
When we assign a probability to each number, we get a random number. When
we assign a probability to each vector, we get a random vector. Similarly, when we
assign a probability to each set, we get a random set. Random sets have indeed been
actively applied in description and processing of uncertainty; see, e.g., (Nguyen
2008) and references therein.
In the discrete case, a random set means that we assign, to different sets A, values
m(A) ≥ 0 such that ∑ m(A) = 1. This is exactly the widely used Dempster-Shafer
A

approach to describing uncertainty.
Relation to fuzzy. One of the reason why random sets are important in describing uncertainty is that they provide a reasonable alternative description of fuzzy
sets. Specifically, one way to assign a membership degree to a statement like “25 is
young” is to take N experts, ask these experts whether a person who is 25 years old
is young, and take the portion N(25)/N of experts who agree with this statement as
the desired degree µyoung (25). This procedure assumes
• that the experts are equally important – because we give equal weight to opinions
of different experts, and
• that each expert is capable of giving a precise (crisp) answer to each such question.
For each of N experts i (1 ≤ i ≤ N), there us denote, by Si , the set of all ages which
for which, for this expert, the person is young. In general, different experts have
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different sets Si , but it is possible that two or more different experts have the same
set.
As we have mentioned, we assume that the experts are equally important, i.e.,
that each expert gets assigned the same probability 1/N. So, if a set Si occurs as
an opinion of only one expert, we assign it the probability 1/N; if it occurs as the
common opinion of several (k) experts, we assign it the probability k/N. Thus, we
have probabilities assigned to different sets, i.e., we have a random set. In terms of
this random set, the degree to which, say, 25 is young, is simply equal to the sum
of the probabilities of all the sets Si that include 25, i.e., to the probability that 25
belongs to the random set.
In general, for the corresponding random set S, for every value x, the membership
degree µ (x) is equal to the probability that x ∈ S: µ (x) = Prob(x ∈ S).
Fourth case: a probability distribution on the class of probability distributions.
In this case, instead of selecting a single probability distribution, we select a probability distribution on the set of these distributions.
Theoretically, we can have an infinite-dimensional class of probability distributions, i.e., a class in which we need to know the values of infinitely many parameters
to uniquely determine the distribution. In practice, in a computer, we can only store
finitely many values of the parameters. Thus, from the practical viewpoint, each
class of probability distributions is characterized by the values of finitely many parameters. There may be only two parameters – like in 1-D Gaussian distributions,
there can be many more parameters as in more sophisticated classes, but there are
always finitely many parameters.
In this case, selecting a probability distribution from the class means selecting the
values of these parameters. Thus, the above situation can be described as follows:
• instead of selecting a unique set of parameters characterizing a probability distribution,
• we select a probability distribution on the set of these parameters.
This idea describes the Bayesian statistical approach, whose main idea is indeed to
select a (prior) distribution on the set of all possible values of different parameters;
see, e.g., (Jaynes 2003), (Gelman et al. 2004).
Summary. Second order granules approach covers many known uncertainty formalisms as particular cases:
probability distributions on . . .
random sets;
Dempster-Shafer approach;
fuzzy approach
. . . probability imprecise probability;
Bayesian statistics
distributions
p-box
. . . sets

set of . . .
set intervals;
rough sets

What if we also consider fuzzy. In the above text, we only consider set-valued
(interval) and probabilistic granules. These granules correspond to “objective”
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(aleatoric) and measurement uncertainty. Expert estimates lead to fuzzy uncertainty,
where we have fuzzy granules – i.e., fuzzy sets. If we add the possibility of fuzzy
granules, then we get new possibilities of second-order granules:
• a set of fuzzy granules, i.e., a set of fuzzy sets – e.g., an interval-valued fuzzy set;
• a probability distribution on the set of fuzzy granules, i.e., a random fuzzy set;
see, e.g., (Li et al. 2002);
• a fuzzy set of fuzzy sets – i.e., a general type-2 fuzzy set;
• a fuzzy class of sets or probability distributions – something which was tried in
imprecise probability research.
Third order granules? In contrast to the second order granules which have many
practical applications, third order ones are rarely used. A few practical examples
include interval-valued fuzzy sets; see, e.g., (Nguyen Kreinovich 1995), (Nguyen et
al. 1997), (Mendel 2001), (Mendel et al. 2010):
• since a fuzzy set can be interpreted as a random set,
• an interval-valued fuzzy set – i.e., a set of possible fuzzy sets – can be interpreted
as a set of possible random sets, i.e., as a third order granule.

5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a natural motivation for granules of higher order, and
showed that these granules provide a unified description of different uncertainty
formalisms such as random sets, Dempster-Shafer approach, fuzzy sets, imprecise
probabilities, and Bayesian statistics.
We also prove that within this general description, most reasonable uncertainty
formalisms have already been discovered: for example, we prove that for fuzzy uncertainty, granules of second order are sufficient.
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Appendix: 2nd Order is Sufficient for Fuzzy Uncertainty
Second order descriptions: the main idea. Experts are often not 100% certain
in the statements they make; therefore, in the design of knowledge-based systems,
it is desirable to take this uncertainty into consideration. Usually, this uncertainty
is described by a number from the interval [0, 1]; this number is called subjective
probability, degree of certainty, etc.
One of the main problems with this approach is that we must use exact numbers
from the interval [0, 1] to represent experts’ degrees of certainty; an expert may be
able to tell whether his degree of certainty is closer to 0.9 or to 0.5, but it is hardly
possible that an expert would be able to meaningfully distinguish between degrees
of certainty, say, 0.7 and 0.701. If you ask the expert whether his degree of certainty
about a certain statement A can be described by a certain number d (e.g., d = 0.701),
the expert will, sometimes, not be able to give a definite answer, she will be uncertain
about it. This uncertainty can be, in its turn, described by a number from the interval
[0, 1]. It is, therefore, natural to represent our degree of certainty in a statement A
not by a single (crisp) number d(A) ∈ [0, 1] (as in the [0, 1]-based description), but
rather by a function µd(A) which assigns, to each possible real number d ∈ [0, 1], a
degree µd(A) (d) with which this number d can be the (desired) degree of certainty
of A. This is called a second-order description of uncertainty.
Third and higher order descriptions. In second-order description, to describe a
degree with which a given number d ∈ [0, 1] can be a degree of certainty of a statement A, we use a real number µd(A) (d). As we have already mentioned, it is difficult
to describe our degree of certainty by a single number. Therefore, to make this description even more realistic, we can represent each degree of certainty d(P(x)) not
by a (more traditional) [0, 1]-based description, but by a second order description.
As a result, we get the third order description.
Similarly, to make our description even more realistic, we can use the third order
descriptions to describe degrees of certainty; then, we get fourth order uncertainty,
etc.
Third order descriptions are not used: why? Theoretically, we can define third,
fourth order, etc., descriptions, but in practical applications, only second order descriptions were used so far (see, e.g., (Nguyen Kreinovich 1995), (Nguyen et al.
1997), (Mendel 2001), (Mendel et al. 2010)). Based on this empirical fact, it is natural to conclude that third and higher order descriptions are not really necessary. We
will show that this conclusion can be theoretically justified.
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First step in describing uncertainty: set of uncertainty-describing words. Let us
first describe the problem formally. An expert uses words from a natural language
to describe his degrees of certainty. In every language, there are only finitely many
words, so we have a finite set of words that needs to be interpreted. We will denote
this set of words by W .
Second step: a fuzzy property described by a word-valued “membership function”. If we have any property P on a universe of discourse U, an expert can describe, for each element x ∈ U, his degree of certainty d(x) ∈ W that the element x
has the property P.
Traditional fuzzy logic as a first approximation: numbers assigned to words
describing uncertainty. Our ultimate goal is to provide a computer representation
for each word w ∈ W . In the traditional [0, 1]-based description, this computer representation assigns, to every word, a real number from the interval [0, 1]; in general,
we may have some other computer representations (examples will be given later).
Let us denote the set of all possible computer representations by S.
In the first approximation, i.e., in the first order description, we represent each
word w ∈ W , which describes a degree of uncertainty, by an element s ∈ S (e.g.,
by a real number from the interval [0, 1]). In this section, we will denote this firstapproximation computer representation of a word w by s = ∥w∥.
If the set S is too small, then it may not contain enough elements to distinguish
between different expert’s degree of belief: this was exactly the problem with classical {0, 1}-based description, in which we only have two possible computer representations – “true” and “false” – that are not enough to adequately describe the
different degrees of certainty. We will therefore assume that the set S is rich enough
to represent different degrees of certainty.
In particular, the set [0, 1] contains infinitely many points, so it should be sufficient; even if we only consider computer-representable real numbers, there are
still much more of them (millions and billions) than words in a language (which is
usually in hundreds of thousands at most), so we can safely make this “richness”
assumption. In mathematical terms, it means that two different degrees of belief are
represented by different computer terms, i.e., that if w1 ̸= w2 , then ∥w1 ∥ =
̸ ∥w2 ∥.
First approximation is not absolutely adequate. The problem with the first-order
representation is that the relation between words w ∈ W and computer representation s ∈ S is, in reality, also imprecise. Typically, when we have a word w ∈ W ,
we cannot pick a single corresponding representative s ∈ S; instead, we may have
several possible representatives, with different degrees of adequacy.
Actual description of expert uncertainty: word-valued degree to which a word
describes uncertainty. In other words, instead of a single value s = ∥w∥ assigned
to a word w, we have several values s ∈ S, each with its own degree of adequacy;
this degree of adequacy can also be described by an expert, who uses an appropriate
word w ∈ W from the natural language.
In other words, for every word w ∈ W and for ever representation s ∈ S, we have
a degree w′ ∈ W describing to what extent s is adequate in representing w. Let us
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represent this degree of adequacy by a(w, s); the symbol a represents a function
a : W × S → W , i.e., a function that maps every pair (w, s) into a new word a(w, s).
Second-order description of uncertainty as a second approximation to actual uncertainty. So, the meaning of a word w ∈ W is represented by a function a which
assigns, to every element s ∈ S, a degree of adequacy a(w, s) ∈ W . We want to represent this degree of adequacy in a computer; therefore, instead of using the word
a(w, s) itself, we will use the computer representation ∥a(w, s)∥ of this word. Hence,
we get a second-order representation, in which a degree of certainty corresponding
to a word w ∈ W is represented not by a single element ∥w∥ ∈ S, but by a function
µw : S → S, a function which is defined as µw (s) = ∥a(w, s)∥.
Second-order description is not 100% adequate either; third-, fourth-order descriptions, etc. The second-order representation is also not absolutely adequate, because, to represent the degree a(w, s), we used a single number ∥a(w, s)∥. To get
a more adequate representation, instead of this single value, we can use, for each
element s′ ∈ S, a degree of adequacy with which the element s′ represents the word
a(w, s). This degree of adequacy is also a word a(a(w, s), s′ ), so we can represent it
by an appropriate element ∥a(a(w, s), s′ )∥. Thus, we get a third-order representation,
in which to every element s, we assign a second-order representation. To get an even
more adequate representation, we can use fourth- and higher order representations.
Let us express this scheme formally.
Definition 1.
• Let W be a finite set; element of this set will be called words.
• Let U be set called a universe of discourse. By a fuzzy property P, we mean a
mapping which maps each element x ∈ U into a word P(x) ∈ W ; we say that this
word described the degree of certainty that x satisfies the property P.
• By a first-approximation uncertainty representation, we mean a pair ⟨S, ∥.∥⟩,
where:
• S is a set; elements of this set will be called computer representations; and
• ∥.∥ is a function from W to S; we say that an element ∥w∥ ∈ S represents the
word w.
• We say that an uncertainty representation is sufficiently rich if for every two
words w1 , w2 ∈ W , w1 ̸= w2 implies ∥w1 ∥ ̸= ∥w2 ∥.
Definition 2. Let W be a set of words, and let S be a set of computer representations.
By an adequacy function, we mean a function a : W × S → W ; for each word w ∈ W ,
and for each representation s ∈ S, we say that a(w, s) describes the degree to which
the element s adequately describes the word w.
Definition 3. Let U be a universe of discourse, and let S be a set of computer representations. For each n = 1, 2, . . ., we define the notions of n-th order degree of
certainty and of a n-th order fuzzy set, by the following induction over n:
• By a first-order degree of certainty, we mean an element s ∈ S (i.e., the set S1 of
all first-order degrees of certainty is exactly S).
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• For every n, by a n-th order fuzzy set, we mean a function µ : U → Sn from the
universe of discourse U to the set Sn of all n-th order degrees of certainty.
• For every n > 1, by a n-th order degree of certainty, we mean a function sn which
maps every value s ∈ S into an (n−1)-th order degree of certainty (i.e., a function
sn : S → Sn−1 ).
Definition 4. Let W be a set of words, let ⟨S, ∥.∥⟩ be an uncertainty representation,
and let a be an adequacy function. For every n > 1, and for every word w ∈ W , we
define the n-th order degree of uncertainty ∥w∥a,n ∈ Sn corresponding to the word w
as follows:
• As a first order degree of uncertainty ∥w∥a,1 corresponding to the word w, we
simply take ∥w∥a,1 = ∥w∥.
• If we have already defined degrees of orders 1, . . . , n − 1, then, as an n-th order
degree of uncertainty ∥w∥a,n ∈ Sn corresponding to the word w, we take a function sn which maps every value s ∈ S into a (n−1)-th order degree ∥a(w, s)∥a,n−1 .
Definition 5. Let W be a set of words, let ⟨S, ∥.∥⟩ be an uncertainty representation,
let a be an adequacy function, and let P be a fuzzy property on a universe of discourse P. Then, by a n-th order fuzzy set (or a n-th order membership function)
(n)
µP,a (x) corresponding to P, we mean a function which maps every value x ∈ U into
an n-th order degree of certainty ∥P(x)∥a,n which corresponds to the word P(x) ∈ W .
We will prove that for properties which are non-degenerate in some reasonable
sense, it is sufficient to know the first and second order membership functions, and
then the others can be uniquely reconstructed. Moreover, if we know the membership functions of first two orders for a non-degenerate class of fuzzy properties, then
we will be able to reconstruct the higher order membership functions for all fuzzy
properties from this class.
Definition 6.
• We say that a fuzzy property P on a universe of discourse U is non-degenerate if
for every w ∈ W , there exists an element x ∈ U for which P(x) = w.
• We say that a class P of fuzzy properties P on a universe of discourse U is nondegenerate if for every w ∈ W , there exists a property P ∈ P and an element
x ∈ U for which P(x) = w.
Comment. For example, if W ̸= {0, 1}, then every crisp property, i.e., every property
for which P(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all x, is not non-degenerate (i.e., degenerate).
Proposition 1. Let W be a set of words, let ⟨S, ∥.∥⟩ be a sufficiently rich uncertainty
representation, let U be a universe of discourse. Let P and P′ be fuzzy properties,
so that P is non-degenerate, and let a and a′ be adequacy functions. Then, from
(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(n)
(n)
µP,a = µP′ ,a′ and µP,a = µP′ ,a′ , we can conclude that µP,a = µP′ ,a′ for all n.
Comments.
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• In other words, under reasonable assumptions, for each property, the information contained in the first and second order fuzzy sets is sufficient to reconstruct
all higher order fuzzy sets as well; therefore, in a computer representation, it is
sufficient to keep only first and second order fuzzy sets.
• This result is somewhat similar to the well-known result that a Gaussian distribution can be uniquely determined by its moments of first and second orders, and
all higher order moments can be uniquely reconstructed from the moments of the
first two orders.
• It is possible to show that the non-degeneracy condition is needed, because if a
property P is not non-degenerate, then there exist adequacy functions a ̸= a′ for
(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(3)
which µP,a = µP,a′ and µP,a = µP,a′ , but µP,a ̸= µP,a′ already for n = 3.
Proposition 2. Let W be a set of words, let ⟨S, ∥.∥⟩ be a sufficiently rich uncertainty
representation, let U be a universe of discourse. Let P and P ′ be classes of fuzzy
properties, so that the class P is non-degenerate, and let φ : P → P ′ be a 1-1transformation, and let a and a′ be adequacy functions. Then, if for every P ∈ P,
(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(n)
(n)
we have µP,a = µφ (P),a′ and µP,a = µφ (P),a′ , we can conclude that µP,a = µφ (P),a′ for
all n.
Comment. So, even if we do not know the adequacy function (and we do not know
the corresponding fuzzy properties P ∈ P), we can still uniquely reconstruct fuzzy
sets of all orders which correspond to all fuzzy properties P.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. Proposition 1 can be viewed as a particular case of
Proposition 2, when P = {P}, P ′ = {P′ }, and φ maps P onto P′ . Therefore, to
prove both Propositions 1 and 2, it is sufficient to prove Proposition 2.
(1)
(1)
We will show that under the conditions of Proposition 2, from µP,a = µφ (P),a′ and
(2)

(2)

µP,a = µφ (P),a′ , we will be able to conclude that φ (P) = P for all P ∈ P, and that
a = a′ ; therefore, we will easily conclude that µP,a = µφ (P),a′ for all n.
Indeed, by definition of the first membership function, for every x ∈ U, we have
(1)
(1)
(1)
µP,a (x) = ∥P(x)∥. Thus, from the equality µP,a = µφ (P),a′ , we conclude that for
every P ∈ P, we have ∥P(x)∥ = ∥φ (P)(x)∥ for all x ∈ U. Since the uncertainty
representation is assumed to be sufficiently rich, we can conclude that φ (P)(x) =
P(x) for all x ∈ U, i.e., that φ (P) = P for every P ∈ P.
Let us now show that a = a′ , i.e., that for every w ∈ W and for every s ∈ S, we
have a(w, s) = a′ (w, s). Indeed, since P is a non-degenerate class, there exists a
value x ∈ U and a property P ∈ P for which P(x) = w. Let us consider the equality
of the second order membership functions for this very P. Since φ (P) = P, the given
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
equality µP,a = µφ (P),a′ can be simplified into the following form: µP,a = µP,a′ . Let
us consider this equality for the above-chosen value x (for which P(x) = w). For this
(2)
x, by definition of the second-order membership function, µP,a (x) = ∥P(x)∥a,2 =
(n)

(2)

(n)

∥w∥a,2 ; and similarly, µP,a′ (x) = ∥P(x)∥a,2 = ∥w∥a′ ,2 ; thus, ∥w∥a,2 = ∥w∥a′ ,2 .
By definition, ∥w∥a,2 is a function which maps every value s ∈ S into a 1-st order degree ∥a(w, s)∥a,1 = ∥a(w, s)∥. Thus, from the equality of the functions ∥w∥a,2
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and ∥w∥a′ ,2 , we can conclude that their values at a given s are also equal, i.e., that
∥a(w, s)∥ = ∥a′ (w, s)∥. Since the uncertainty structure is sufficiently rich, we conclude that a(w, s) = a′ (w, s). The proposition is proven.
Proof of a comment after Proposition 1. Since P is not non-degenerate, there
exists a value w0 ∈ W which cannot be represented as P(x) for any x ∈ U. Let us
pick arbitrary elements x0 ∈ U and s0 ∈ S, and define a(w, s) and a′ (w, s) as follows:
• first, we define a(w, s) = a′ (w, s) for all words w of the type w = P(x): namely, we
take a(P(x0 ), s0 ) = a′ (P(x0 ), s0 ) = w0 and take arbitrary other values for different
pairs (w, s) with w = P(x);
• then, we define a(w, s) and a′ (w, s) for the remaining pairs (w, s): namely, we take
a(w0 , s0 ) = w0 , a′ (w0 , s0 ) = P(x0 ) ̸= w0 , and we define a and a′ arbitrarily for all
other pairs (w, s).
Let us show that for thus chosen adequacy functions, the membership functions of
first and second order coincide, but the membership functions of the third order
differ. Indeed:
(1)

(1)

• For the first order, we have, for every x, µP,a (x) = ∥P(x)∥ and similarly, µP,a′ (x) =
(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

∥P(x)∥; therefore, µP,a (x) = µP,a′ (x) for all x. Hence, µP,a = µP,a′ .
(2)

• For the second order, for every x, µP,a (x) is a function which maps s ∈ S into
(2)

a value ∥a(P(x), s)∥a,1 = ∥a(P(x), s)∥. Similarly, µP,a′ (x) is a function which
maps s ∈ S into a value ∥a′ (P(x), s)∥a′ ,1 = ∥a′ (P(x), s)∥. For words w of the type
P(x), we have defined a and a′ in such a way that a(w, s) = a′ (w, s); therefore,
(2)
(2)
∥a(P(x), s)∥ = ∥a′ (P(x), s)∥ for all x and s. Thus, µP,a = µP,a′ .
• Finally, let us show that the third order membership functions differ. We will
(3)
(3)
show that the values of the functions µP,a and µP,a′ differ for x = x0 . Indeed, by
definition of the third order membership function,
(3)

• µP,a (x0 ) is a function which maps every s into the value ∥a(P(x0 ), s)∥a,2 , and
• µP,a′ (x0 ) is a function which maps every s into the value ∥a′ (P(x0 ), s)∥a′ ,2 .
(3)

To prove that these function are different, it is sufficient to show that their
values differ for some values s; we will show that they differ for s = s0 , i.e.,
that ∥a(P(x0 ), s0 )∥a,2 ̸= ∥a′ (P(x0 ), s0 )∥a′ ,2 . By our construction of a, we have
a(P(x0 ), s0 ) = a′ (P(x0 ), s0 ) = w0 , so the inequality that we need to prove takes
the form ∥w0 ∥a,2 ̸= ∥w0 ∥a′ ,2 .
By definition, ∥w0 ∥a,2 is a function which maps every value s ∈ S into ∥a(w0 , s)∥a,1 =
∥a(w0 , s)∥. Similarly, ∥w0 ∥a′ ,2 is a function which maps every value s ∈ S into
∥a′ (w0 , s)∥a,1 = ∥a′ (w0 , s)∥. For s0 , according to our construction of a and a′ ,
we have a(w0 , s0 ) = w0 ̸= P(x0 ) = a′ (w0 , s0 ). Thus, since the uncertainty representation is sufficiently rich, we conclude that ∥a(w0 , s0 )∥ ̸= ∥a′ (w0 , s0 )∥, and
(3)
(3)
therefore, that ∥w0 ∥a,2 ̸= ∥w0 ∥a′ ,2 and µP,a = µP,a′ .
The statement is proven.

